From Disability Theory to Practice by Christopher A. Riddle

Author:Christopher A. Riddle
Language: eng
Format: epub
Publisher: Lexington Books, a division of Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.
Published: 2018-06-28T11:55:34+00:00

75Chapter Six

Can a Social Model of Disability Encompass “Mental Illness”?

David Wasserman

Introduction

In the introduction to his 1993 book entitled Physical Disability and Social Policy, Jerome Bickenbach explained why he limited himself to this one kind of disability:

Any general discussion of disablement ought to be independent of the kind of disability at issue, and, in particular, whether the disability is physical or mental. Yet although a persuasive argument could be made that this distinction is overly drawn and artificial, there does seem to be a difference between the two that should make a difference in what a social commitment to equality requires. That crucial factor is mental competence.

Needless to say, as a culture we are still very far from understanding what ought to flow from incompetence; perhaps in the end, incompetence should not make a difference to our policy at all, other than to point out a different set of needs that must be accommodated. Still, the controversy over how best to characterize competence and the appropriate social and legal responses is far too extensive to be dealt with here.1

Writing almost two decades later, David Pilgrim and Floris Tomasi criticized the reliance on such a notion of incompetence to justify a different social response to mental than to physical disability (a justification that Bickenbach did not endorse):

The track record of psychiatric patients forging a common cause with those with physical disabilities has been weak and patchy. … The demonstrated discrimination against physically disabled people has emerged in societies that have not adopted enabling policies to promote social inclusion. In the case of mental 76health problems, social exclusion is actively justified on grounds of unreason. Indeed, a whole legislative apparatus is constructed to ensure and oversee that social exclusion; an arrangement deemed to be socially progressive.

It is because people with mental health problems are deemed to be inherently unreasonable that others assume they should be “justifiably” subject to unequal treatment: their rights for equal treatment are held in abeyance, until they are deemed less of a risk to themselves and others. This is not then an expression of political ignorance or neglect (as has been the case often in relation to physical disability) but a deliberate and highly considered aspect of social policy.2

Indeed, after decades of liberalization, the social policy in the United States may be turning more restrictive in light of the apparent role of mental health problems in recent mass killings.

In the past 15 years, disability scholarship and activism have become more attentive to mental disability,3 with the decline of the materialist emphasis of the early disability rights movement (e.g., the leading U.K. disability group in the last quarter of the twentieth century was called the Union of Physically Impaired against Segregation; emphasis added).4 During the same time period, disability scholars have become more critical of the underlying definition and classification of “impairments”—an even more salient issue for mental than physical differences.5 In a convergent movement, some psychiatric self-advocacy groups, notably the Autism Self-Advocacy Network, have embraced a qualified social model

Download

Copyright Disclaimer:
This site does not store any files on its server. We only index and link to content provided by other sites. Please contact the content providers to delete copyright contents if any and email us, we'll remove relevant links or contents immediately.